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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Un réseau sans fil ad hoc ne requiert aucune infrastructure préexistante ni aucune autorité 
centrale. C’est un réseau déployé de façon dynamique. Les nœuds doivent participer 
activement  et coopérer avec les fonctions basics dans le réseau telles que le routage, 
l’adressage et la sécurité. Grâce à leur mobilité, les nœuds rompent et créent des liens 
dynamiquement, favorisant la constante évolution de la topologie du réseau. 
 
Dans les réseaux ad hoc, l’attaque wormhole est une attaque sévère où deux nœuds 
malveillants redirigent le trafic entre deux extrémités. Ces nœuds malicieux manipulent 
l’algorithme de routage, contrôlant ainsi l’information partagéé entre les nœuds honnêtes. La 
plupart des solutions proposées dans la littérature nécessitent des ressources exceptionnelles. 
  
Dans la première partie de cette thèse, nous présentons une vaste revue de la littérature des 
plus importantes solutions proposées pour contrer les attaques wormhole. Dans la deuxième 
partie, nous proposons un nouveau protocole nommé WIM-DSR pour détecter et éviter les 
attaques wormhole dans les réseaux ad hoc. Cette solution exploite l'information du réseau 
additionnel obtenue lorsqu’un protocole de routage multi-chemin est utilisé. Avec cette 
information supplémentaire, le protocole WIM-DSR recherche des comportements suspects 
liés aux attaques wormhole. 
 
Nous avons pu démontrer dans cette thèse que WIM-DSR offre une solution solide contre les 
attaques wormhole sans nécessiter de ressources exceptionnelles. En utilisant seulement de 
l’information déjà existante dans le réseau.  
 
 
Mots-clés: ad hoc networks, security, DSR, wormhole attack, multipath. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Wormhole attacks in ad hoc networks have attracted a great deal of attention over the years. 
These are serious events involving two malicious nodes tunneling traffic from one end of the 
network to the other.  
 
Several approaches have been proposed to detect these attacks, but only a few solutions 
exploit the information provided by multipath routing schemes. In this document, we present 
a review of the most important solutions proposed for counteracting wormhole attacks, as 
well as a new approach for detecting them. 
 
The Witness Integration Multipath protocol is a new approach to searching ad hoc networks 
to detect and prevent wormhole attacks. This approach exploits the extra network 
information obtained when the multipath Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol is used 
and finds suspicious behavior related to such attacks. It does not require any major protocol 
modification, nor as much cryptographic processing as the solutions previously proposed. 
 
 
Keywords: ad hoc networks, security, DSR, wormhole attack, multipath. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile ad hoc networks have been an attractive field of research for many years now. Their 
characteristics make them an excellent choice for emergency operations, vehicular 
communication, and short-live networks.  
 
Ad hoc networks must deal with threats from both external agents and compromised internal 
agents. The lack of a central control and the fact that each node must forward packets of 
other nodes pose major security challenges. In such environments, it is difficult to ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity of the communications, as well as the availability of the services.  
 
We focus here on the wormhole attack, one of the most serious threats to ad hoc networks. In 
this attack, two malicious nodes tunnel traffic from one end of the network to the other using 
an out-of-band link or an encapsulated link that takes advantage of the resources of the 
network. Their main goal is to attract traffic to drop, alter, or simply look at the packets later 
on. 
 
Because of the characteristics of wormhole attacks, cryptographic solutions are not sufficient 
to prevent them. Numerous physical approaches have been proposed to secure the neighbor 
discovery process. Most of the solutions presented so far require that the nodes handle 
information about self-location, perform clock synchronization, or rely on information such 
as the trust relationship or on specialized antennas. Only a few solutions have been proposed 
to secure the overall end-to-end route discovery process. 
 
Specifically, we propose a new approach to prevent Layer-3 wormhole attacks based on a 
multipath source routing protocol. The Witness Integration Multipath DSR (WIM-DSR) 
solution relies on the information provided by the routing protocol itself to determine 
whether or not there are some typical inconsistencies usually associated with these attacks. 
This solution does not require any cryptographic processing by the intermediate nodes if no 
attack takes place. Furthermore, it does not have any impact on packet length. These two 
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features represent the main advantages over previous solutions (Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 
2003; Wang et al., 2006). 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the background and literature on ad 
hoc networks and the major routing protocol attacks. Chapter 2 describes the notion of a 
wormhole attack. Chapter 3 presents a review and analysis of wormhole attack solutions. In 
chapter 4, we present 4 WIM–DSR, which is an innovative protocol offering a new and 
inexpensive mechanism for preventing wormhole attacks. Finally, the results of the 
simulations are presented and analyzed in chapter 5. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1  
 
 
WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORK BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents a general introduction to wireless ad hoc networks. Section 1.1 presents 
definitions of ad hoc networks and the forwarding process in these networks. Section 1.2 
presents an introduction to routing protocols in ad hoc networks. Finally, in section 1.3, a 
review of the major threats and attacks to which ad hoc routing protocols are subject is 
presented. 
 
1.1 Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 
A wireless ad hoc network is a network deployed without any pre-existing infrastructure, 
which can be built on dynamically without any centralized administration (see Figure 1.1). 
The lack of a central authority and predefined infrastructure require all nodes in the network 
to participate actively in the common network functions, such as routing, addressing, 
security, etc. Nodes are free to move arbitrarily in the network, breaking and creating links 
dynamically, thereby constantly changing the topology of the underlying network. 
 
S
v4
D
v1
v2
v3
v7
v5
v6
v8
v9
 
Figure 1.1  Wireless Ad Hoc Network. 
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The nodes participating in an ad hoc network must handle the routing process without the 
support or supervision of a central authority or any previously established infrastructure. As 
those nodes usually have a limited range of transmission, the packets exchanged between two 
nodes that are outside each other’s transmission range must be forwarded on a hop-by-hop 
basis by intermediate nodes until the destination is reached.  
 
Figure 1.2 shows how a packet having the node S as the source and the node D as the 
destination must be forwarded by the intermediate node A, since S is outside the transmission 
range of D. 
 
S
D
A
Node transmision range  
Figure 1.2  Packet forwarding in ad hoc networks. 
 
Due to their self-organization and rapid deployment capabilities, mobile ad hoc networks can 
be used for several purposes, for example in battlefield communications, sensor networks, 
emergency relief scenarios, public social services, the virtual class room, etc. 
  
1.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Routing Protocols 
Unlike classical wired and wireless infrastructure networks, where packets are routed toward 
a destination using central authority devices (e.g. base stations or routers) and a predefined 
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infrastructure, in ad hoc networks, the functions performed by those elements must be 
achieved by the nodes themselves.  
 
The inherent characteristics of ad hoc networks, such as its high mobility, fast topology 
changes, and battery power limitations, have made the routing protocols used in traditional 
networks inaccurate. This means that other routing protocols specially designed for ad hoc 
networks must be used. 
 
Based on the route created, ad hoc routing protocols can be classified into two main 
categories: (a) proactive; and (b) reactive. In a proactive routing protocol, the nodes register 
the changes in the network topology and periodically update routing information. In contrast, 
in a reactive routing protocol, the routes are discovered on-demand, i.e. only when they are 
required. 
 
1.2.1 Proactive Routing Protocols 
A proactive or table-driven routing protocol seeks to maintain consistent up-to-date routing 
information from all the possible paths connecting each node to every other node in the 
network. Table-driven routing protocols require each node to create and maintain one or 
several routing tables to store routing information, even though some routes may never be 
used. The nodes propagate routing updates periodically to their neighbors, in order to react to 
changes in the network topology and keep up-to-date routing information related to the entire 
network. 
 
Proactive routing protocols have low latencies, since routes are already available when they 
are required. But the periodic exchange of routing updates increases the routing traffic 
substantially, and can have a major impact on the bandwidth of the network, especially in 
networks with a high density and/or high mobility rate. In those kinds of networks, changes 
in the network topology constantly generate demands from the routing protocol to keep the 
routing information up to date. 
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Proactive routing protocols are basically used in networks with low mobility or supporting 
traffic requiring low latency (such as voice and other real-time services). 
 
Two of the most popular proactive routing protocols in ad hoc networks are the Destination-
Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) and the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) 
Protocol. 
 
Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) Routing Protocol 
 
The Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) routing protocol (Perkins and Bhagwat, 
1994) is a table-driven routing protocol, where each node in the network maintains a routing 
table including the number of hops required to reach any destination and the next node in the 
path. The routing table also includes a sequence number generated by the destination node, 
which makes it possible to ensure the freshness of the route. When a new route update packet 
is created, the value of the sequence number is increased, guaranteeing that it is the most 
recent route update. 
 
DSDV guarantees loop-free routes through the use of these sequence numbers. When a node 
receives new information involving an already active route, the node compares the sequence 
numbers of the update and the existing routes in the table. If the new sequence number is 
higher than the one in the table, the entry for that route is modified. Otherwise, the update is 
discarded and no modification is made. 
 
Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) Protocol 
 
Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) protocol (Jacquet et al., 2001) is a link state routing 
protocol adapted to ad hoc networks. In OLSR, nodes must transmit a periodic routing 
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advertisement called link-state advertisement (LSA), which lists their direct neighbors. Those 
route advertisements must be flooded throughout the network efficiently (see  
Figure 1.3). 
 
S
 
Figure 1.3  Flooding of route messages  
without optimization. 
 
To reduce the number of LSAs traversing the network, the OLSR protocol introduces the 
concept of multipoint relay (MPR) nodes. The main purpose of MPR nodes is to allow an 
optimal transmission of LSAs through the network. Each node in the network must choose a 
minimal set of MPRs from its 1-hop neighbors. Those nodes are selected to ensure that the 
LSAs can reach all the 2-hop neighbors of the node.  
 
In Figure 1.4, the node S broadcasts an LSA message containing its routing updates to their 
neighbors. Each of its 1-hop neighbors receives the message, but only those nodes forming 
part of the MPR set of node S are authorized to forward the LSA message, reducing the 
number of broadcasts and hence the overhead generated by the routing update process. 
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S
Selected MPR nodes  
Figure 1.4  Selection of MPR nodes.  
 
Two types of message are generally used in the OLSR protocol, which are (a) HELLO 
messages; and (b) Topology Control (TC) messages. 
 
A HELLO message is used by the nodes to develop the neighbor discovery process and the 
MPR selection. In OLSR, each node periodically generates a HELLO message containing the 
list of its 1-hop neighbors and its own address. Exchanging HELLO messages frequently, 
each node in the network can build its list of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors. HELLO messages 
are exchanged locally between the 1-hop neighbors and are not broadcast beyond that point. 
When a node has its list of 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors, it selects the minimum number of 
nodes from its 1-hop list, allowing it to reach all the nodes in its 2-hop list. Those nodes will 
form part of its MPR list. 
 
When a node A has been selected as an MPR by another node B, node A must add node B to 
its MPR selector set list. This list contains all nodes that have selected node A as an MPR. 
 
The Topology Control (TC) messages are the LSA messages of the OLSR protocol. TC 
messages are used to exchange route information in the network. TC messages are advertised 
periodically by MPR nodes, and they contain their MPR selector set list. Only MPR nodes 
can forward TC messages. When a node receives the TC messages from all its MPRs, it can 
9 
recalculate its routing table with the information provided in those messages, building a route 
toward all the nodes in the network. 
 
The OLSR protocol is one of the most important ad hoc routing protocols, and wide-ranging 
research is being developed to improve its performance and solve its security limitations. 
 
1.2.2 Reactive Routing Protocols 
Reactive or on-demand routing protocols create a route between two nodes only when a 
message needs to be exchanged between them. When a node needs to communicate with 
another and no route is available, the source node begins a route discovery process to find a 
route between the source and the destination, if such a route exists. 
 
After establishing a route, the path is maintained by a route maintenance protocol until the 
end of the information exchange or until the destination becomes inaccessible. 
 
The advantage of an on-demand routing protocol is the lower routing overhead generated 
when compared to that of proactive routing protocols. This is because no regular routing 
updates are exchanged by the nodes in the network, and routing traffic floods the network 
only when a route is required.  
 
However, the delay generated by the route discovery process in finding a route is a concern 
for several applications (especially real-time applications, such as voice services). 
 
Two of the most common on-demand routing protocols (Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)) are described below. 
 
Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)  
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The Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol (Perkins and Royer, 1999) is a 
reactive routing protocol developed specially for ad hoc networks. In AODV, when a node S 
wants to send a packet to a node D and there is no available route, node S uses a Route 
Request (RREQ) message to discover that route (see Figure 1.5). A RREQ message contains 
the IP addresses of the originating and target nodes.  
 
The intermediate nodes that receive a RREQ message and do not have a fresh route to the 
destination rebroadcast the message to their neighbors, and so on, until the destination 
receives the RREQ message. 
S v4 D
v1
v2
v8
v3 v9
v6
v7v5
RREQ flood
 
Figure 1.5  Flooding of RREQs in AODV. 
 
After receiving the RREQ message, the destination uses the reverse path from which the 
original RREQ is received and forwards a unicast Route Reply (RREP) message to the 
source S (see Figure 1.6). 
 
11 
S v4 D
v1
v2
v8
v3 v9
v6
v7v5
Physical link
RREP backward path
 
Figure 1.6  RREP backward path. 
 
Other RREQ messages arriving at the destination later would be ignored. AODV allows 
intermediate nodes having a fresh enough route to the destination to respond and send a 
RREP message back containing the path to the destination node D.  
 
AODV supports a route reparation mechanism using a Route Error (RERR) message. This 
message allows nodes that testify to the invalidation of a route to inform other nodes making 
use of that route about the link break. The RERR contains the list of destinations which have 
become unreachable as a consequence of the break. 
 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) Protocol 
 
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol (Johnson et al., 1996) is an on-demand routing 
protocol that creates routes only when they are required, and does not exchange periodic 
routing traffic searching to create or maintain routes.  
 
DSR is a source routing protocol. This means that, when a source node forwards a packet 
toward a destination, the source must add to the packet header the IP addresses of all 
intermediate nodes that the packet needs to traverse before arriving at the destination. 
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In DSR, when a node needs to send a packet to another node, it consults its route cache, 
searching for a valid route. If no valid route is found, the source begins the route discovery 
process. 
 
In a route discovery process, the source node broadcasts a RREQ message containing its IP 
address, the IP address of the target node, and a unique identification number. Each 
intermediate node receiving the packet checks the unique identification number to confirm 
that this is the first time the message has been received, then the node searches its route cache 
for a route to the destination that is fresh enough. If no route is found, the intermediate node 
adds its own IP address and broadcasts the RREQ message, and so on, until the RREQ 
arrives at the destination (or an intermediate node with a fresh enough path to the destination) 
that responds to the source with a unicast RREP message using the reverse of the path 
obtained from the RREQ message. 
 
Once the source receives the RREP message, it can start sending packets to the destination. 
Since the received message contains the IP addresses of all the intermediate hops in the path 
linking the two nodes, the message can be easily routed by an intermediate node, extracting 
the IP address of the next hop from the packet header. This means that intermediate nodes are 
not required to buffer the routing information for the traversing packets. 
 
1.3 Major Routing Protocol Attacks in Ad Hoc Networks 
An adversary can develop several attacks in ad hoc networks, taking advantage of constraints 
imposed by the nature of those networks, especially the lack of a fixed infrastructure and 
central control.  
 
Examples of attacks in ad hoc networks include, but are not limited to: 
 
• Data integrity attacks 
• Illegitimate upgrading of privileges 
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• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
• Passive eavesdropping 
• Modification or injection of packets 
• Signaling attacks 
• Device stealing 
We present below a review of the major attacks and threats in wireless ad hoc networks 
(Anjum and Mouchtaris, 2007). 
 
1.3.1 Black Hole Attack 
In a black hole attack, a malicious node broadcasts the network with forged routing 
information. The malicious node ensures the best route toward a part of the network, causing 
naïve nodes to route data packets through the malicious one.  
 
After being selected as the proxy node, the attacker can drop the whole traffic performing a 
denial of service attack (DoS) or drop packets selectively, generating a grey hole attack (e.g. 
dropping only packets directed toward a specific network or n from each m packet, or a 
packet every t seconds). 
 
An example of a black hole attack is illustrated in Figure 1.7, where malicious node A sends 
a fake RREP to the source node S, claiming that it has a fresh enough route toward the 
destination, the source node S will choose the route passing through node A, which, after 
finding a route to node D (e.g. sending a RREQ itself), will have access to the traffic 
exchanged between nodes S and D, and can begin to drop the packets that node S sends to 
node D. 
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Figure 1.7  Black Hole attack. 
 
1.3.2 Spoofing Attack 
In a spoofing attack, an attacker attempts to impersonate a legitimate node by taking over its 
identity. With this attack, a malicious node can gain access to all the packets addressed to the 
victim. 
 
An example of a spoofing attack is the man-in-the-middle attack (see Figure 1.8), where 
malicious node B spoofs node A into believing that malicious node B is node C, and spoofs 
node C into believing that malicious node B is node A. So, nodes A and C believe they are 
communicating with each other directly, but they are really communicating with the 
mediation of the malicious node B which controls all the exchanged traffic. 
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Figure 1.8  Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
 
In OLSR (Jacquet et al., 2001), a link spoofing attack can be developed by a malicious node 
which advertises a fake link with 2-hop neighbors of a victim node, causing the victim node 
to select the attacker as its MPR. In the role of MPR of the victim node, the attacker can 
control the traffic going toward the target node (Kannhavong et al., 2007). 
 
In Figure 1.9, malicious node A announces to node S that it shares links with nodes 3v  , 4v , 
and 5v , and a fake node xv . Thus, A is elected by S as the only valid MPR. After that, 
malicious node A controls all the traffic going toward S. If A throws out the packets related to 
S, the victim node can be isolated from the rest of the network. 
 
S v4 D
v1
v2
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v3 v9
v6
v7v5
A
 
Figure 1.9  Link Spoofing attack 
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1.3.3 Sybil Attack 
The Sybil attack incorporates a malicious device with the ability to illegitimately take on 
several identities in the same network. The forged identity from a malicious device is called a 
Sybil node. A malicious device can obtain an identity for a Sybil node in two different ways 
(Newsome et al., 2004); (a) generating a new identity; or (b) taking the identity from an 
existing node (with the cooperation of the node or by developing a spoofing attack). 
 
Fabricated identity 
 
In an ad hoc network where there is no central authority or predefined infrastructure, nodes 
must find a way to self-assign IP addresses. Taking advantage of this limitation, an attacker 
would create several addresses and allocate them to its Sybil nodes.  
 
Existing identity 
 
If there is a mechanism in the network limiting the free creation of new identities, an attacker 
can be obligated to steal the identity of an existing node (spoofing attack). The malicious 
node can either develop the impersonation far away from the legitimate node, preventing 
repair or temporarily disabling the victim node (e.g. through a DoS attack). In Figure 1.10, 
the malicious device A develops a Sybil attack creating a Sybil node with the identity of the 
legitimate node S, which is far away from the attack location. 
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Figure 1.10  Sybil attack. 
 
Moreover, two or more colluding nodes can participate in a coordinated Sybil attack by 
exchanging their IP address and cryptographic information (if there is any) and creating Sybil 
nodes with this information. In Figure 1.11, an attacker controlling malicious nodes A and B 
creates Sybil nodes A and B with the information from the original nodes. 
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Figure 1.11  Sybil attack with colluding nodes. 
 
1.3.4 Wormhole Attack 
This is a serious attack developed by at least two colluding nodes sharing a private link or 
communicating via a tunnel that uses the existing resources of the network. 
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As the main objective of this thesis is to propose a method for detecting and preventing this 
attack, a detailed description of their characteristics is presented in the next chapter.  
 
 CHAPTER 2  
 
 
WORMHOLE ATTACK 
A wormhole attack is a serious attack developed on mobile ad hoc networks by at least two 
attackers sharing a private link and strategically located in the network. One of these 
attackers records the data obtained at one side of the network and tunnels it to the attacker at 
the other side, who replays the packets at that end. In Figure 2.1, colluding nodes 1M  and 
2M  perform a wormhole attack tunneling the traffic sent by source node S toward destination 
node D. 
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Figure 2.1  Wormhole attack. 
 
Through replaying on one side of the network packets originating on the other side, the 
attackers search to manipulate the routing protocol, making other nodes believe they are 
closer, forcing all affected nodes to communicate through the malicious link. In this way, the 
wormhole attackers can have access to the packets exchanged by the victims and perform 
several other attacks, like a black hole attack (dropping all traffic), grey hole attacks 
(dropping a selected part of the traffic and forwarding the other part), or simply 
eavesdropping in the network, searching for sensitive information like cryptographic keys. 
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2.1 Classification of wormhole attacks 
We present here several different models used to classify wormhole attacks. In section 2.1.1, 
we explain the two different classifications of wormhole attacks based on the communication 
technique used by the colluding nodes. Section 2.1.2 presents the classification of wormhole 
attacks based on the visibility of the attackers in the network. Section 2.1.3 introduces the 
Active-x-y wormhole attack model, and, finally, in section 2.1.4, we present the OSI Layer 
wormhole attack model.  
 
2.1.1 Classification of wormhole attacks based on communication techniques  
Wormhole attackers can use two different communication techniques to perform their attack 
(Wang et al., 2006): an encapsulation channel and an out-of-band channel.   
 
Wormhole attack using an encapsulation channel 
 
In this type of wormhole attack, two malicious nodes search to disrupt the normal operation 
of the routing protocol in the network, involving themselves in the route discovery process. 
To achieve this goal, the malicious nodes must give the false impression that the route 
through them is shorter than the other routes, even when they may be separated by a larger 
number of hops. 
 
In Figure 2.2, if a reactive routing protocol (AODV, DSR, etc.) is used, when the node S 
seeks to establish a path toward the node D broadcasting a RREQ message, as soon as the 
malicious node 1M  hears the RREQ packet, it encapsulates the message into a new one 
intended for 2M  and tunnels it using the existing path between them ( 1M -A-B- 2M ).  
21 
S D{AM1 M2B}
Physical linkFalse route wormhole{}
 
Figure 2.2  Wormhole using encapsulation. 
 
Once node 2M  receives the message from node 1M , it decapsulates the packet recovering 
the original RREQ message and broadcasts it, seeking to reach node D. When the RREQ 
arrives at D, the number of hops presented in the packet will be fewer than the real number of 
hops traversed. In this way, in the presence of an algorithm using the number of hops as the 
metric of path selection, the malicious nodes will increase their possibility of being part of 
the chosen route. 
 
In contrast, if a proactive routing protocol like OLSR is used, the malicious nodes 1M  and 
2M  (Figure 2.2) will capsulate the HELLO messages from node S toward node D, and vice 
versa, through the path 1M -A-B- 2M  (see Figure 2.3). As a consequence, the neighbor 
discovery process is manipulated, giving nodes S and D false information about their 
neighbor nodes and malicious nodes 1M  and 2M  controlling the traffic shared between 
nodes S and D. 
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Figure 2.3  Encapsulation of HELLO messages. 
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This attack can be effortlessly deployed because it does not require additional hardware 
capability, but the delay caused by the process of tunneling messages between the two 
malicious nodes also makes it more easily detectable, and hence several measures can be 
implemented to prevent it. For this reason, this type of attack alternative is less efficient. 
 
Wormhole attack using an out-of-band channel 
 
This type of wormhole attack is launched by two malicious nodes strategically located in a 
network sharing an out-of-band high-bandwidth channel (wired or wireless). In Figure 2.4, 
when node S broadcasts a control message (RREQ, HELLO, etc.) directed to node D, the 
malicious node 1M  receives the message and tunnels it to malicious node 2M  using the 
shared out-of-band high-bandwidth channel. Node 2M  receives the control message and 
broadcasts it, seeking to reach node D. As the packets traveling through the wormhole link 
have the shortest delay and a smaller number of hops than the packets traveling by 
legitimates links, the wormhole link will have a higher probability of being chosen as part of 
the elected path connecting nodes S and D. 
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Figure 2.4  Wormhole attack using an out-of-band link. 
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2.1.2 Classification of wormhole attacks based on the visibility of malicious nodes 
Based on the exposure of malicious nodes, wormhole attacks can be classified into three 
types: closed, half-open, and open (Wang et al., 2006).  
 
Closed wormhole attacks 
 
In closed wormhole attacks, two malicious nodes tunnel the packets from one end of the 
wormhole to the other and rebroadcast them without modifying them or adding any 
information, even when the packet is part of the route discovery process. In this way, the 
malicious nodes are invisible to the rest of the network. This attack can be developed by 
external agents (such as transceiver). In Figure 2.5 (a), the malicious nodes 1M and 2M  
develop a closed wormhole attack, making nodes S and D believe they are directly 
connected. 
 
Half-open wormhole attacks 
 
In a half-open wormhole attack, as shown in Figure 2.5 (b), only one of the malicious nodes 
adds its information to the control packet header according to the normal routing protocol, 
while the other malicious node tunnels and rebroadcasts the packets without adding any 
information about itself. 
Open wormhole attacks 
 
In this type of wormhole attack, the malicious nodes 1M and 2M  are composed of internal 
nodes that participate actively in the routing protocol. The attackers include their own 
information in the control packet header according to the normal procedure. They do not hide 
their presence in the network, but lie about the distance that separates them, making honest 
nodes believe that the two malicious nodes are direct neighbors. In Figure 2.5 (c), both 
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attackers ( 1M  and 2M ) are visible to nodes S and D, but the information about the distance 
between them is falsified. 
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Figure 2.5  Classification of wormhole attacks. 
 
2.1.3 Active-x-y wormhole attack model 
Attackers in a wireless ad hoc network can be classified as passive or active, depending on 
their interaction with the network. A passive attacker does not create or modify packets, but 
only eavesdrops on the network. This type of attacker mainly represents a threat to privacy. 
 
An active attacker can create and/or modify packets in a neighboring discovery, routing, or 
packet forwarding process, and also eavesdrop on communication between other nodes. This 
kind of attack is developed using compromised nodes. When an attacker compromises a 
node, it normally has access to the resources and information owned by the compromised 
node, including cryptographic keys. 
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In the attacker model proposed by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson (Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2005), 
an active attacker owning n nodes in a network of which m are compromised can be denoted 
an Active-n-m attacker.  
 
A wormhole attack developed by an active attacker owning two colluding nodes can be 
modeled as an Active-2-x attack, where 0 2x≤ ≤ . Hence, the possible wormhole attacks that 
can be developed by this attacker in the network can be described as Active-2-0, Active-2-1, 
or Active-2-2 attacks.  
 
An Active-2-0 wormhole attack (closed wormhole) uses two external nodes, an Active-2-1 
attack (half-open) uses one external and one compromised node, and, finally, an Active-2-2 
attack (open wormhole) involves two compromised nodes. 
 
2.1.4 OSI Layer wormhole attack model 
Another characterization of a wormhole attack has been proposed by Buttyán and Hubaux 
(Buttyán and Hubaux, 2008). In this approach, the term is used exclusively for a layer-2 
attack, where the malicious agents are simply transceivers exchanging messages from one 
end of the network to the other (closed or Active-2-0 wormhole attacks). Those malicious 
agents remain invisible to the set of legitimate nodes.  
 
The term tunneling attack is proposed for layer-3 attacks, where at least one of the colluding 
nodes is a compromised node participating actively in the routing protocol (open and half-
open attacks). 
 
2.1.5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we use the classification proposed by Wang et al. (open, half-open, and closed 
wormholes). 
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The malicious nodes can use either a physical out-of-band link (wired or wireless) or a 
logical encapsulated tunnel in the network itself. However, we assume the existence of the 
first alternative, since it is more realistic, because the second kind of wormhole attack can be 
easily detected due to the delay generated by the encapsulation of the message. This 
assumption will be made even when our approach can work efficiently in both. 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3  
 
 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF WORMHOLE COUNTERMEASURES 
Wormhole attacks represent a serious threat to ad hoc networks, and the classical security 
methods are inappropriate to face this menace. As a result, a wide variety of new wormhole 
attack discovery and prevention techniques have been proposed. A review of the main 
approaches is presented in this chapter.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents the most important 
solutions proposed to counteract closed wormhole attacks. Section 3.2 reviews the main 
solutions to open wormhole attacks. Finally, in section 3.3, we present a general summary of 
the current wormhole attack solutions. 
  
3.1 Solutions for closed (Layer-2) wormhole attacks  
As mentioned in section 2.1.2, closed wormhole attacks are developed by external agents 
seeking to threaten the security of the network by attacking the neighbor discovery (ND) 
protocol. The nature of wireless ad hoc networks, where the mobility of the nodes generates a 
constant modification of the network topology, makes attacks against ND relatively easy and 
securing ND a difficult problem (Poturalski, Papadimitratos and Hubaux, 2008). 
 
In the closed wormhole attack, an external attacker falsely convinces a group of honest nodes 
that they are neighbors. The proposed solutions to thwart this attack are based on the 
deployment of a secure neighbor discovery protocol which allows an honest node to verify 
that the distance separating it from a remote node is shorter than the maximum allowed 
transmission distance in the network.  
 
The solutions proposed for securing the ND protocol can be organized in several groups, 
according to their characteristics. 
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3.1.1 Distance Bounding Solutions 
The distance bounding approaches establish an upper limit to the distance separating two 
nodes. This distance is calculated using the signal round-trip delay time of a challenge-
response exchange or the received signal strength. If the resulting distance is larger than the 
maximum allowed distance in the network (which would be the case in a closed wormhole 
attack), the nodes estimate that a wormhole attack is being developed. 
 
Temporal Leashes 
 
An important solution proposed to the closed wormhole attack is the packet leash approach. 
The concept of using packet leashes for detecting wormhole attacks was introduced 
originally by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson (Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2003). This approach is 
based on the assumption that all the nodes in the network have location-aware mechanisms 
and/or synchronized clocks. Exchanging time and/or position information securely, two 
nodes can calculate an upper limit of the distance between them. 
 
There exist two kinds of packet leashes: temporal and geographic. To use temporal leashes, 
all the nodes in the network must have tightly synchronized clocks. The maximum clock 
synchronization error Δ  must be known by each node in the network. When node A forwards 
a packet to an assumed neighbor node B, it includes in the packet the time when the packet is 
sent, st . Node B will compare st  with the time when the packet is received, rt . An 
approximation of the distance between the two nodes can be calculated using rt , st , and the 
signal propagation speed. If the packet has traveled too far, it must be eliminated. 
 
Hu, Perrig, and Johnson also propose a modification to temporal leashes, in this case the 
sending node adding an expiration time et  to the packet instead of st . If the expiration time 
has passed when the packet arrives at the next-hop node, it is discarded (Hu, Perrig, and 
Johnson, 2003). This approach does not offer significant advantages over the previous one, 
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other than the lower calculation effort required by the receiver node which needs only to 
compare the expiration time et  in the packet with its own reception time rt , this gain in 
computation time being negligible. The receiving node must trust the sending node, because 
this latter is the one that defines the value of et . 
 
The authenticity of messages in temporal leashes is ensured using the TIK (TESLA with 
Instant Key disclosure) protocol. TIK is an extension of the TESLA broadcast authentication 
protocol (Perrig et al., 2000). It offers efficient authentication for broadcast communication 
and a temporal leash based on a message authentication code (MAC). 
 
The use of temporal leashes involves a tight synchronization between nodes. Special 
hardware must be added, hindering the deployment of this solution. Another difficulty lies in 
the fact that a sender does not know exactly when a packet will be sent, because of the 
contention-based characteristic in the MAC layer. This delay can add a non negligible error, 
making the solution non viable (Zhenning et al., 2004). In addition, the authors (Hu, Perrig, 
and Johnson) assume that the sending and receiving delay of the packet are negligible, but, in 
reality, especially when an RF signal is used, the error generated by the processing delay can 
be considerable. 
 
The temporal leash approach was designed to secure the ND process and to prevent closed 
wormhole attacks. Therefore, it cannot detect open or half-open wormholes because of the 
hop-by-hop basis of this solution.  
 
In Figure 3.1, nodes S and D are capable of verifying the distance of the links 1MS −  and 
DM −2  respectively using temporal leashes, but the distance of the link 21 MM −  cannot be 
verified by any honest node, leaving open and half-open wormhole attacks undetected. 
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Figure 3.1  Open wormhole. 
 
Time-of-Flight techniques  
 
An approach comparable to the temporal packet leash approach is based on the time of flight 
of packets in the network. Essentially, the concept behind this technique is the following: 
there is a direct relationship between the distance that separates two points and the time it 
takes a signal to travel between them (Brands and Chaum, 1994; Capkun et al., 2003; 
Singelee and Preneel, 2005). If a signal travels a distance d in a time t at constant speed v, d 
can be given by: 
 
 d v t= ∗   
 
Let srD  be the distance between the nodes s and r, c  the signal propagation speed, δt  the 
total round-trip travel time measured between the two nodes, dt  the processing delay time at 
node r, and pt  the one-way propagation time between the two nodes. The distance srD  can 
be approximated theoretically by: 
 *
2sr
tD c δ=   
  
where: 
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 2* p dt t tδ = +   
 
A mechanism to decrease the value of dt , which is a considerable source of error, is 
proposed by Capkun, Buttyan and Hubaux (Capkun, Buttyan and Hubaux, 2003). In this 
approach, each node must be equipped with a special hardware module allowing the response 
to a one-bit challenge with a one-bit response without involving any CPU participation and 
with a delay time dt tending to zero. Replacing dt = 0, then 2* pt tδ = , an approximate 
distance srD can be calculated as follows: 
 
 *sr pD c t=   
 
This approach eliminates the need for tightly synchronized clocks. A node only requires the 
temporal information provided by its own clock, but any value of the processing delay time 
dt  different to zero adds a high error value to the distance calculated. In addition, the 
required use of esoteric hardware makes the cost of the solution prohibitive.  
 
TrueLink is an approach proposed by Jakob et al. to deter wormhole attacks, which uses the 
store-and-forward technique (Jakob, Srikanth, and Michalis, 2006). It secures the ND process 
by verifying the adjacency of a pair of apparent neighbors using an exchange of 
cryptographically authenticated nonces in a tight timing scenario. This restricted time would 
not allow a malicious attacker to store and replay the packets at both ends of the wormhole 
link. 
 
This approach fails to detect wormhole attacks when the malicious nodes replay the packet 
on a bit-by-bit basis instead of waiting for the whole packet to be collected at one end of the 
wormhole before forwarding it to the other end. In addition, this approach will leave open 
attacks undetected.  
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Received Signal Strength techniques 
 
There are several proposals for calculating the distance between two points using the 
received signal strength (Meguerdichian et al., 2001; Patwari et al., 2003). The basic 
principle is that the strength of a signal decreases in proportion to the distance traveled. 
 
If a node receives a signal and the value of the transmitted signal strengths is predefined or 
added by the source in the message, the receiving node can calculate an approximation of the 
distance using  the difference between the transmitted and received signal strength values and 
a theoretical path loss model, as proposed in (Rappaport, 2002).  
 
If the signals of several sources (like anchor nodes) are available, as well as their location 
information, the destination node can calculate an approximation of its location using 
empirical models, as proposed by Barbeau and Robert (Barbeau and Robert, 2006). 
 
The advantage of this technique is that no additional hardware is required, and even resource-
constrained nodes can use it. However, it requires that a trust relationship exist between the 
nodes. A strong assumption is also required: the nodes must not be able to modify their 
signal transmission power. Furthermore, the obstacles in the path modify the strength of the 
signal, adding an error to the calculated distance or location. Therefore, these approaches are 
very limited. 
 
3.1.2 Location-aware approaches 
There are several approaches using location-aware information for detecting and/or 
preventing wormhole attacks. The most important proposals are presented  below. 
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Geographical Leashes  
 
Hu, Perrig, and Johnson propose a variation of temporal leashes, where the nodes add self-
location information to the packets, permitting neighbor nodes to calculate the distance 
separating them. With the distance obtained using the location information, the nodes can 
develop a secure ND process (Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2003). 
 
To build a geographical leash, each node in the network must have the information 
concerning its own location. In addition, all nodes must have loosely synchronized clocks. 
When a node sends a packet, it includes in the packet the information concerning its own 
location sp and the time when the packet is sent, st . The node receiving the packet compares 
the time and position values included in the packet with its own position, rp , and the time 
when the packet is received, rt .  
 
Let Δ  be the clock synchronization error, v  the maximum node velocity, and σ  the 
maximum possible location error. The receiving node can calculate the upper limit distance 
to the sending node srd  using the equation: 
 
  
 2 ( )sr s r r sd p p v t t σ≤ − + − + Δ +   
 
In this way, a node can detect a wormhole attack if the calculated upper limit distance is not 
consistent with the information provided by the sending node.  
 
Geographical leashes use a signature scheme to provide authentication and non repudiation. 
This approach, based on asymmetrical cryptography, can be computationally expensive, 
especially for the sender. 
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Geographical leashes require the existence of a mechanism providing correct location 
information to every node in the network. Global Positioning System (GPS) technology is 
generally proposed to provide this information.  
 
Unfortunately, this technology has several limitations. The price of the devices remains high, 
limiting the use of geographical leashes in a mass application. The low location precision 
introduces a non negligible error into the estimate of the distance. Finally, the performance of 
the technology inside buildings is restricted. These constraints reduce the applicability of 
GPS in geographical leashes. 
 
Geographical leashes is a protocol created to secure the ND process. It shares the same 
limitations as temporal leashes, relative to the detection of open and half-open wormhole 
attacks. 
 
Directional antennas 
 
Hu and Evans (Hu and Evans, 2004) propose the use of directional antennas to detect 
wormhole attacks. In this approach, each node communicates with the other nodes using a 
specific sector of its antenna. A node receiving a message has general information 
concerning the location of the other node based on the sector where the message has been 
received.  
 
In Figure 3.2, we present a simplified circular model of a sector antenna where the range of 
the node transmission is divided into six equally sized zones. 
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Figure 3.2  Sector antenna with 6 zones. 
 
If a node S sends a (cryptographically protected) packet to its supposed neighbor node D 
using zone 1, node D should receive the packet in the opposite zone (4 in this case). If a 
wormhole attack exists, it would introduce inconsistencies in the sending and receiving zones 
that could be easily detected if honest nodes collaborate with each other to exchange accurate 
information. 
 
Hu and Evans (Hu and Evans, 2004) introduce the concept of the link verifier node. A valid 
verifier V for the link formed by nodes S and D must fulfill two conditions: 
 
1. Node D must hear nodes S and V in different zones. 
2. Nodes D and V must hear node S in different zones. 
 
According to this approach, if at least one verifier node V is found for the link formed by 
nodes S and D, then no wormhole attack is being developed over this link. 
 
The solution presented by Hu and Evans (Hu and Evans, 2004) works well in terms of 
securing the ND process, thereby detecting closed wormhole attacks, but it is unable to detect 
open or half-open wormholes. This approach is based on the supposition that the 
communication, on a hop-by-hop basis, is established between honest nodes in an unsafe 
channel, which is not the case with open and half-open wormhole attacks.  
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In Figure 3.3, in the presence of a half-open wormhole attack formed by the malicious nodes 
1M  and 2M , if the hidden wormhole node 1M hears the packets sent by node S and tunnels 
them to malicious node 2M with the information of the zone where it heard the packet, 2M  
can establish a link with S through the wormhole link without being detected. In this case, 
node V fulfills the requirement to be the verifier node to the specified link.  
 
Moreover, the cost of sector antennas is higher compared to omnidirectional antennas. This 
overcost can be a restraining factor in the massive application of this technique. 
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Figure 3.3  Wormhole attack against the sector antenna approach. 
 
Lazos and Poovendran propose a modified approach which seeks to provide a secure 
localization method for honest nodes in networks with malicious adversaries (Lazos and 
Poovendran, 2004). This approach requires the presence in the network of a set of special 
nodes called locators. These nodes are equipped with directional antennas and self-location 
information. The rest of the nodes require no special hardware.  
 
The nodes can calculate their location using beacons generated by the locator nodes. These 
beacons relay information about the locator’s coordinates and the zone of the antenna from 
which the message was transmitted. With this information, a node picking up signals from 
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beacons coming from several locators can approximate its location as the center of gravity 
(CoG) of the overlapping regions calculated with the information provided by the beacons. 
 
This approach can detect a closed wormhole attack by combining the information of the 
beacon’s transmission zone and its estimated location; however, open and half-open 
wormhole attacks remain undetected. Also, even if the implementation cost of this approach 
decreases compared to that of the directional antennas (Hu and Evans, 2004), since most 
nodes in the network do not require them, the anchor nodes require additional access to up-
to-date location information. Moreover, the computation of the location in the nodes can be 
resource-consuming. 
 
3.1.3 Graphical and statistical techniques 
Buttyán, Dóra, and Vajda propose an approach for detecting closed wormhole attacks in 
static sensor networks (Buttyán, Dóra, and Vajda, 2005). Their approach assumes a large 
number of sensor nodes and a small number of base stations placed uniformly on a flat two-
dimensional surface. The base stations have unlimited resources and location-aware devices. 
 
An undefined cryptographic protocol ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity 
of the messages exchanged between the nodes and the base stations. 
 
The authors propose two wormhole detection mechanisms. The first is based on the fact that 
a closed wormhole link increases the number of 1-hop neighbors of the nodes within its 
radius. If the distribution of the placement of the nodes is known, the base stations can use 
the neighbor information collected by the nodes in the network to detect a significant 
variation of that distribution using statistical tools. If the distribution difference is larger than 
a predefined threshold, then a wormhole is detected. 
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The second detection mechanism is based on the fact that a wormhole attack modifies the 
distribution of the length of the shortest path between a pair of nodes affected by the 
wormhole link. 
 
Using the distribution of the placement of the nodes, the base stations calculate a histogram 
of the lengths of the shortest paths between all possible pairs of nodes in the network. Then, 
they recalculate the same histogram based on the information provided by the nodes. If the 
difference between the two histograms is larger than a predefined threshold, then a wormhole 
is detected. 
 
The approach is limited to a dense network with uniformly distributed sensors where the 
distribution of the nodes is known, limiting its applicability. In addition, node mobility is not 
supported. The presence of central base stations with unlimited resources is not suitable in ad 
hoc networks.  
 
This approach does not detect open or half-open attacks. Also, if the protocol detects the 
presence of a wormhole attack, it is not capable of offering even an approximation of the 
location of the wormhole link, and therefore no countermeasures can be taken after an attack 
has been detected. 
  
Lazos et al. propose a graph theory approach to prevent closed wormhole attacks in static 
networks (Lazos et al., 2005). Their approach is based on the use of location-aware guard 
nodes (LAGNs) equipped with self-location capability. 
 
The approach uses the concept of local broadcast keys (LBKs). These are pair-wise keys 
shared between the 1-hop neighbors, making it possible to secure the ND process. If LBKs 
are used, a message encrypted with a local key on one side of the network cannot be 
decrypted on the other side of the network.  
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Nodes use the information broadcast by LAGNs to detect inconsistencies generated by the 
presence of wormhole attacks. In the absence of a wormhole attack, the nodes must receive 
just one copy of a message broadcast by a neighbor LAGN. If several copies of a message 
from a LAGN arrive at a node, then a replay message attack is being developed by one or 
several malicious nodes. 
 
Moreover, the distance separating two LAGNs can be calculated by an intermediate node 
using the location information provided by each LAGN in its broadcast messages. If the node 
can hear both LAGNs, the distance separating them cannot be larger than 2R (where R is the 
maximum transmission range of the LAGNs). If the distance is larger than 2R, a wormhole 
attack is being developed. 
 
The neighbor nodes obtain their LBKs from fractional keys securely distributed by the 
LAGNs. Two neighbor nodes having w fractional keys in common can establish an LBK, if 
w is larger than a predefined threshold. Therefore, if a node receives a message encrypted 
with a key that does not belong to its LBK set, then the message must have been generated 
by a non neighboring node on another side of the network and tunneled by a wormhole. 
 
Even though this approach is of interest, it has several limitations. It is only applicable in 
static networks, and it assumes the presence of trustable LAGNs with self-location 
information. Those assumptions are generally hard to fulfill in ad hoc networks. Finally, 
since this approach is limited to providing a way of securing the neighbor discovery process, 
open and half-open attacks are not detected. 
 
Maheshwari, Gao, and Das propose a distributed scheme based purely on local connectivity 
information (Maheshwari, Gao, and Das, 2007). This approach detects wormhole attacks by 
discovering forbidden structures introduced into the connectivity graph of the network by the 
presence of a wormhole link. 
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A forbidden structure is a sub-graph that cannot be present in a connectivity network without 
wormholes. These structures are detected using the notion of a packing argument, which 
stipulates that there is a limited number of nodes inside a fixed region which can be displayed 
without sharing edges. For example, a maximum of 5 nodes with pair-wise distances larger 
than 1 can be placed in a unit disk. A forbidden structure violates the packing argument. 
 
The approach assumes that each node is capable of creating its list of k-hop neighbors. With 
this information, the node searches for a forbidden structure in its k-hop neighborhood, the 
algorithm for which has a computational complexity that depends on k. The authors develop 
simulations of the approach using a value of 2k ≤ . Several simplified communication 
models (Unit-Disk model (UDG), Quasi-UDG model, and TOSSIM model) are used. 
 
The approach yields no false alarms and a 100% detection rate when fully connected 
networks are simulated with the presence of a single wormhole link and a value of 2k ≤ . 
The simulations do not analyze the consequences of mobility in the approach. The 
irregularity of antenna patterns can introduce a significant error and the computational 
resources necessary for the nodes to search for forbidden structures in its k-hop neighborhood 
list can be overwhelming, especially when a high value of k is chosen. 
 
In order to detect open and half-open wormhole attacks, the nodes in the network must 
perform an analysis with values of k larger that 3. 
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Table 3-1  Summary of solutions for closed (Layer-2) wormhole attacks 
 
Method Approach Pros Cons 
Distance Bounding 
solutions 
Temporal Leashes 
(Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2003) 
Does not require a 
location mechanism. 
Requires tight synchronization 
beyond the capability of existing 
devices. 
Time of Flight 
(Brands and Chaum, 1994; 
Capkun et al., 2003; Jakob, 
Srikanth, and Michalis, 2006; 
Singelee and Preneel, 2005). 
 
RSS 
(Barbeau and Robert, 2006; 
Meguerdichian et al., 2001; 
Patwari et al., 2003) 
Does not require a 
location mechanism. 
Requires additional hardware. Not 
secure. Easy to thwart. High error. 
Dependence on external variables 
(obstacles, environment, etc.). 
Location-aware 
solutions 
Geographical Leashes 
(Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2003) 
Very good solution, 
robust. 
Requires additional hardware 
(GPS, loosely synchronized 
clocks). Expensive. Limitations 
associated with GPS technologies. 
Directional Antennas 
(Hu and Evans, 2004; Lazos et 
al., 2005) 
Good solution. Expensive, requires trustable nodes. 
Graph and Statistical 
solutions 
(Buttyán, Dóra, and Vajda, 2005) Inexpensive, no 
additional hardware 
required. 
Limited, does not support mobility. 
No wormhole location provided 
after detection. 
(Lazos et al., 2005) Interesting concept of 
LBK. 
Limited, does not support mobility, 
requires Central Authority. 
(Maheshwari, Gao, and Das, 
2007) 
Good simulation results 
(especially for dense 
networks). 
Lack of results in a real 
deployment. 
 
3.2 Solutions for open (Layer-3) wormhole attacks 
As presented in section 2.1.2, the open wormhole attack involves at least two colluding 
internal nodes making honest nodes believe that they are neighbors, even when they are 
separated by a distance longer than the maximum distance allowed in the network. 
 
Several approaches have been proposed to avoid the open wormhole attack. The major 
proposals are presented below. 
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3.2.1 Location-aware approaches 
Wang and Wong  propose the end-to-end detection of wormhole attacks in ad hoc networks 
using the concept of the smallest hop count estimation between source and destination 
(Wang and Wong, 2007). 
 
In this approach, all nodes must have location-aware information and share a cryptographic 
authentication mechanism (pairwise secret or public keys). A destination node must respond 
to a RREQ with a modified RREP, including its current location. Based on this information, 
the source node calculates its distance to the destination node. 
 
If a uniform distribution of nodes and a known density function are assumed, the smallest 
hop count separating a source and a destination node can be estimated using statistical tools. 
Comparing this value with the hop count of the RREP message, if the estimated smallest hop 
count is larger than the information obtained from the RREP message, the source can predict 
the presence of a wormhole link in the path.  
 
If a wormhole attack is predicted, the source must begin a tracing procedure to detect the 
location of the wormhole link. The source forwards a tracing packet along the suspicious 
path. Each intermediate node receiving the message must reply with a tracing-response 
packet indicating its actual position, and so on, until the destination node receives the packet 
and sends out the response. With the location information of all the intermediate nodes, the 
source calculates the smallest hop count for every intermediate node. If the test fails for an 
intermediate node, the wormhole is located between this node and its previous hop. In this 
case, the path is not used. 
 
The advantage of this approach is that, like other location-aware approaches (Hu, Perrig, and 
Johnson, 2003) (Wang et al., 2006), it does not require clock synchronization. The approach 
generates a cumulative estimation error, which means that the result can be inaccurate, 
especially when the distance between the source and the destination is long (several hops 
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away). Also, it does not detect wormhole links where the distance separating two malicious 
nodes is short (a few hops away). 
 
The authors assume a uniform distribution of the nodes and a known density function. Those 
assumptions do not regularly hold in ad hoc networks. 
 
To conclude, this approach can detect a limited number of open and closed wormhole attacks 
(where the source-destination distance is not too large and the wormhole link is not too 
short), but cannot detect open wormhole attacks and is susceptible to the Sybil-Wormhole 
attack.  
 
In Figure 3.4, the malicious nodes 1M  and 2M  develop a coordinated wormhole attack. If 
the malicious nodes have access to the cryptographic information of a third malicious node 
3M , then they can create a Sybil node 3M  and place it in the middle of the wormhole link. In 
this way, the real path traversed by the packet (S, 1M , 2M , D) will be changed by the path 
(S, 1M , 3M , 2M , D).  
 
When the destination node D performs the calculation of the distances and speeds for 
intermediate nodes, the wormhole link will not be detected if the colluding nodes choose the 
right position and time information for Sybil node 3M .  
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Figure 3.4  Sybil-Wormhole attack. 
 
Wang et al. propose a modification to geographical packet leashes (Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 
2003), where instead of a hop-by-hop verification made by every single node in the path, an 
end-to-end verification is made by the destination node (Wang et al., 2006). This approach 
allows the destination node to detect open, closed, or half-open attacks. 
 
Wang et al. assume the secrecy and authenticity of the communication between honest nodes 
through the use of pairwise secret keys shared between any pair of honest nodes in the 
network, digital signatures or a variant of TESLA (Perrig et al., 2000). 
 
When a node A sends a packet toward a destination D, it adds to the packet the local time and 
position when the packet is sent , ,S send S sendt P , besides the MAC of the packet.  
 
Each intermediate node forwarding the packet must add two [time, position] pairs: ,rec rect P  
and ,send sendt P  (the receiving and the sending time and position of the packet respectively) 
and a newly calculated MAC for the packet. When the destination node D receives the 
packet, it will contain the time and position information of each node in the path, as well as 
each MAC, ensuring that the information added by each node in the packet cannot be 
modified later by another node. 
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With the collected information, the destination can calculate the distances between 
intermediate nodes and their average moving speed. Let Δ  be the maximum clock 
synchronization error, v  the maximum node velocity, and σ  the maximum possible location 
error in the network. Then, if, for an intermediate node X, 
 
 
Send
X send X rec
X X rec
p p
v
t t
σ− −
>
− + Δ
  
 
there is an incongruity in the position and/or time information given by node X, then this 
node is participating in a wormhole attack.  
 
The disadvantage of this approach is the overhead added to the packet header with the 
inclusion of the pair position time and the MAC computation by each node. Also, the 
computation of the MAC code generates a processing load for the intermediate nodes, and, 
more especially, for the destination node, which will require a great deal of processing power 
and considerable storage capability for buffering the information coming into the packet 
header and the computation of the MAC codes of all intermediate nodes on a real-time basis. 
 
In addition, as the approach does not assume the presence of trusted hardware such as 
tamperproof tokens, it allows colluding nodes to participate in a Sybil-Wormhole attack, 
circumventing the security mechanisms and remaining undetected.  
 
Lee et al. propose another approach where an end-to-end verification is used, but here, 
instead of the destination node, it is the source node that performs the verification using the 
information in the RREP message (Lee, Jeon, and Kim, 2007). 
 
After receiving the RREQ, the destination unicasts a RREP packet to the source using the 
path obtained from the RREQ message. When an intermediate node receives the RREP, it 
compares its actual location with the location in the RREP and forwards the packet only if 
the two locations coincide.  
46 
 
The source calculates the distance between the intermediate nodes using the location 
information in the RREP packet, verifying that each distance in the path is shorter than the 
maximum 1-hop distance allowed in the network. If any of the distances fail the test, the 
RREP is discarded and the nodes forming the link are put on a list of suspicious nodes. 
 
The approach uses public key cryptography to ensure that a malicious intermediate node is 
not capable of modifying the location information in the packet. The destination signs the 
RREP packet before forwarding it, and the source confirms the signature of the destination in 
the packet before processing it. If the packet fails the verification, it is discarded. 
 
The approach proposed by Lee, Jeon, and Kim (Lee, Jeon, and Kim, 2007) is able to detect 
open, half-open, and closed wormhole attacks, but requires each node in the network to have 
access to self-location information. This approach adds the danger of congestion at the source 
node, because of the assigned verification responsibilities, and is also susceptible to the 
Sybil-Wormhole attack (see Figure 3.4). 
 
3.2.2 Statistical technique 
Qian, Song, and Li  propose a different approach for detecting wormhole attacks based on a 
statistical analysis of multipath routing protocols (Qian, Song, and Li, 2007). The authors 
observe that, when a wormhole attack is developed in a multipath environment, the malicious 
link appears with the greatest frequency in the route discovery process, because it is 
extremely attractive to routing requests.  
 
The difference between the most frequent and the second most frequent links in a route 
discovery will be greater in the presence of a wormhole attack. This characteristic allows the 
detection of a link suspected of being part of a wormhole attack. The protocol does not 
perform any action after discovering a suspect link, because it is supposed to be part of an 
IDS system. 
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This approach does not require special hardware or changes to existing routing protocols, but 
is limited because it bases the wormhole attack confirmation on the assumption that the 
suspicious nodes will begin dropping packets right at the end of the routing process. This 
assumption is not accurate, because the goal of a wormhole attack can be different to 
generating a black/grey hole attack. It may simply want to eavesdrop on network 
communications. Furthermore, if the wormhole nodes wait for a time t after the end of the 
discovery route process before launching the black/grey hole attack, they will circumvent the 
security protocol and remain undetected. 
 
Closed or half-open wormhole attacks cannot be detected with this approach. In the case of a 
closed wormhole attack, the malicious nodes will not appear in the information obtained in 
the multipath route discovery protocol, and no suspicious link with an abnormally high 
frequency will be found. In the case of a half-open wormhole attack, one of the malicious 
nodes will appear in most of the discovered paths, but the approach does not focus on single 
nodes appearing with abnormal frequency, but on frequently appearing links. 
 
Finally, the authors present the results obtained using uniform static grid networks. It would 
be necessary to evaluate the result of the approach in randomly deployed networks to ensure 
the accuracy of the approach. 
 
3.2.3 LiteWorp and MobiWorp 
Khalil, Saurabh, and Shroff propose an approach called LiteWorp (Khalil, Saurabh, and 
Shroff, 2005). This protocol seeks to detect wormhole attacks in static networks. The 
protocol assumes that there are no compromised nodes at network deployment, and that an 
attacker will require at least a time CTT  (compromise threshold time) for compromising any 
node. In this interval of time, each node builds a secure list of 1-hop neighbor nodes R  and 
shares this list securely with its neighbors.  
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At the end of CTT , each node has a secure list of its 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors. With this 
information, a phase of local monitoring begins. The concept of the guard node is introduced. 
For a node G to be the guard node of the link formed by nodes A and B, G must be a 
neighbor of both, and monitors all the packets exchanged through the link A-B.  
 
As seen in Figure 3.5, G is the guard node from link BA −  in the path DBAS −−− . The 
information exchanged between A and B  is monitored by node G , which can discover 
whether or not abnormal behavior is developed by any of them. 
 
In LiteWorp, additional information containing the address of the previous hop is added to 
each packet forwarded by a node. If node A wants to forward a packet received from node S 
(see Figure 3.5), it must add the address of node S as the previous hop of the message. In this 
way, node G can confirm that the packet was really received by node A from node S. 
 
S DA
G
B
Physical link  
Figure 3.5  Node Guard concept. 
 
In Figure 3.6, the malicious nodes 1M and 2M  search to develop a wormhole attack. 2M  
receives a control message (RREQ, HELLO, etc.) from 1M  directed from S  to D .  
 
After receiving the message, 2M  has two options: (1) identify node 1M as the previous hop 
of the message; or (2) identify one of its own neighbors ( 4v  in this case) as the previous hop. 
In the first case, the control message will be rejected by all the neighbors of 2M , because 
they know that node 1M is not a valid 1-hop from node M2.  
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In the second case, the packet will be rejected because the guard node from the link 4 2v M−  
( 3v  or 6v ) knows that the message was not forwarded by 4v . 
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Figure 3.6  Wormhole attack. 
 
This is an interesting approach, but its application is restricted to static networks, because the 
protocol does not allow modification of the neighbor list made during the initial setup time. 
Static routing would be a less complicated solution in static networks. 
 
Khalil, Bagchi, and Shroff propose an approach called MobiWorp (Khalil, Bagchi, and 
Shroff, 2008), which seeks to overcome the mobility limitation of LiteWorp (Khalil, 
Saurabh, and Shroff, 2005), conserving its original structure. This protocol uses the same 
approach with guard nodes watching over the various links in the network.  
 
To avoid the limitations caused by a static list of neighbors made at the time of deployment 
of the network, a central authority (CA) is assumed. When a node needs to change its 
position in the network, it must know its actual position, its final position, and its average 
speed of travel before moving. With this information, the CA will provide the node with an 
Authentication Neighbor Update Message (UNAM). The node must present this 
authenticated message to its new neighbors. They will add the mobile node to their neighbors 
list, allowing them to exchange packets with the new node.  
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This approach is aimed at overcoming the limitations of the original protocol (Khalil, 
Saurabh, and Shroff, 2005), but adds some requirements that can be hard of fulfill in ad hoc 
network environments. The need for a CA runs counter to the essence of the ad hoc network. 
 
Also, the assumption that each node has previous knowledge of its present and future 
position, aside from the average travel speed, is unrealistic and difficult to apply in ad hoc 
networks. This requirement would demand that every movement in the network be 
previously planned. In addition, if all nodes have self-location information, then other, more 
efficient approaches, such as geographical packet leashes, should be used.  
 
3.2.4 Trust-based solutions 
Pirzada and Mcdonald propose a solution to encapsulation channel-based wormhole attacks 
using a trust-based model (Pirzada and Mcdonald, 2006). Each node in the network must 
build a trust table representing its level of trust with respect to one another node in the 
network. The value of the trust level in a specific node is the result of the combination of two 
singles variables, pP  and AP , where pP  indicates the presence (with a value of 1) or the 
absence (with a value of 0) of a wormhole attack involving the node in question. AP  indicates 
the willingness of a node to participate in the routing process and seeks to detect selfish 
nodes. 
 
A node willing to forward a packet to its neighbors buffers the packet header before the 
transmission. After forwarding the packet, the node switches its wireless interface to 
promiscuous mode, and overhears the channel during a predefined time interval TUI (Trust 
Update Interval), seeking to detect the retransmission of the message made by its neighbors. 
 
Before the TUI timeout, if the node overhears the retransmission of the message made by one 
of its neighbors, the node compares the packet header of the retransmitted packet with the 
copy buffered initially. If no abnormal change has been made to the packet header, the node 
concludes that its neighbor is not a malicious node participating in a wormhole attack. The 
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value of pP  for that node is set to false and AP  is increased. Otherwise, if the packet header 
has been abnormally modified, the value of pP  for that node is set to true and the node is 
declared as participating in a wormhole attack. 
 
If, at the end of the TUI timeout, the node does not overhear the retransmission of the packet, 
its neighbor is declared to be selfish and its AP  value is decreased. 
 
Links using nodes with a low AP  can potentially be used in a specific forwarding path if there 
is no other, more trustable link available. Otherwise, nodes cataloged as malicious cannot be 
included in any path and must be isolated from the network. 
 
This proposal is very limited, because it can only be applied to wormholes based on 
encapsulation channels where malicious nodes modify a received message to tunnel it using 
the resources of the network. As mentioned before, this kind of wormhole attack has a very 
limited application spectrum, mainly due to the delay added to the packet in the 
encapsulation between the two malicious nodes. This delay allows the application of simple 
timing techniques to detect it (Xu and Boppana, 2007). 
 
In the case of out-of-band wormhole attacks, the attacker can easily circumvent the security 
measures, forwarding to the network a valid copy of the message after sending the copy to 
the colluding node using the out-of-band channel. In this way, the victim will hear the 
transmission of the malicious node and will conclude (erroneously) that the attacker is an 
honest node. 
 
Also, this approach allows malicious nodes to develop blackmail attacks, where legitimate 
nodes are qualified as malicious and isolated from the network. 
 
No analysis of the number of false positives and false negatives generated by the approach 
has been performed. Also, the method for selecting the value of TUI is not presented. The 
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choice of this value is critical, because it can generate a significant number of false positives 
and/or false negatives if it is not correctly chosen. 
 
3.2.5 Network visualization 
Weichao and Bharat propose a centralized approach using network visualization to detect 
wormhole attacks in static sensor networks (Weichao and Bharat, 2004). The existence of a 
centralized authority is assumed. This station is called the controller and does not have 
resource limitations. 
 
In this proposal, each node must develop an ND process and calculate the distance to their 
neighbors using RSS. Each node sends a list with the calculated distance to each of its 
neighbors to the controller. With this information, the controller uses the Multidimensional 
Scaling (MDS) technique (Davidson, 1983) to reconstruct a layout of the network. The 
approach uses a smoothing function to minimize the impact of the error in the reconstructed 
network. 
 
Since the assumed network is made up of static sensors deployed in a plane field and making 
up a connected graph, the reconstructed surface will be relatively flat in the absence of 
wormhole attacks. A wormhole attack introduces abnormal values into the connectivity 
graph, generating a bent surface around the two ends of the wormhole link. 
 
In spite of seeming interesting, the approach has several major limitations. The assumption of 
a dense network deployed on a flat surface is very limiting.  The presence of irregularities in 
the surface where the nodes are deployed, or a low sensor density, generates an error that 
makes the proposal inapplicable.  
 
The requirement of a central authority is not suitable for ad hoc networks. Moreover, in the 
case of closed and half-open wormhole attacks, the approach can generate a blackmail attack 
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after accusing nodes that establish network relationships through the wormhole link of being 
malicious. 
 
Finally, the approach does not support node mobility, and the simulation does not show the 
performance of the protocol in the case of a large-scale network. 
 
Wang and Lu propose a modification of the above solution to support node mobility (Wang 
and Lu, 2007). To handle the increment of traffic required to reconstruct the network 
structure in the presence of node mobility, the authors propose the use of an incremental 
MDS instead of  the original MDS. 
 
The use of the incremental MDS reduces the computational complexity of the reconstruction 
of a network with n nodes from O( 3n ), when the original MDS is used, to O( 2n ). In 
addition, the authors propose a system interface permitting a user to monitor the network and 
detect wormhole attacks by visualizing the resulting reconstructed network.  
 
To reduce the complexity of the topology in the system interface, the authors add a self-
adaptive tool which permits the system interface to adjust the resolution of the network 
obtained, thereby automatically redefining the sample points. 
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Table 3-2  Summary of solutions for open (Layer-3) wormhole attacks 
 
Method Approach Pros Cons 
Location-aware 
solutions 
Geographical 
Information 
 
(Lee, Jeon, and Kim, 
2007; Wang and Wong, 
2007) 
Robust, can be trusted. Generates overhead in the packet 
header and a high processing 
overload for intermediate nodes. 
Requires GPS. Susceptible to the 
Sybil-Wormhole attack. 
Smallest hop count 
estimation. 
 
(Wang and Wong, 2007) 
No clock synchronization 
required 
Cumulative estimation error. 
Does not detect short wormholes. 
Does not perform well when the 
distance between the source and 
the destination is long. Requires 
additional hardware. 
Statistical solutions (Qian, Song, and Li, 2007) No additional hardware required. 
No protocol modification 
required. 
Assumptions not accurate. Not 
results in randomly deployed 
networks. 
LiteWorp and 
MobiWorp 
(Khalil, Bagchi, and 
Shroff, 2008; Khalil, 
Saurabh, and Shroff, 
2005) 
Relatively simple. Limited, does not support 
mobility (LiteWorp) or requires 
a central authority and location 
information (MobiWorp). 
Trust-based 
solutions 
(Pirzada and Mcdonald, 
2006) 
No additional hardware required Limited to encapsulation 
channels. Easy to circumvent. 
Susceptible to blackmail attack.  
Network 
visualization 
(Wang and Lu, 2007; 
Weichao and Bharat, 
2004) 
Innovative. Centralized solution. 
 
 
3.3 General summary of existing wormhole attack solutions 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have presented the most important existing approaches for detecting 
and/or preventing open and closed wormhole attacks. Since half-open wormhole attacks are a 
combination of both of these, there are no specific solutions for this threat, but several 
solutions used either for open or closed attacks, or both, are also effective for detecting 
and/or preventing half-open attacks. 
 
In Table 3-3, we present a general summary of the various approaches and their applicability 
to detecting and/or preventing open, half-open, and/or closed wormhole attacks. 
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Table 3-3  General summary of the various approaches 
 
Method Approach Open Half-
open 
Closed 
Distance Bounding 
solutions 
Temporal Leashes 
(Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2003) 
  X 
Time of Flight 
(Brands and Chaum, 1994; Capkun et al., 2003; 
Jakob, Srikanth, and Michalis, 2006; Singelee and 
Preneel, 2005) 
  X 
RSS 
(Barbeau and Robert, 2006; Meguerdichian et al., 
2001; Patwari et al., 2003) 
  X 
Location-aware solutions Geographical Leashes 
(Hu, Perrig, and Johnson, 2003) 
  X 
Geographical Information 
(Lee, Jeon, and Kim, 2007; Wang and Wong, 2007) 
X X X 
Smallest hop count estimation. 
(Wang and Wong, 2007) 
X X X 
Directional Antennas 
(Hu and Evans, 2004; Lazos et al., 2005) 
  X 
Graph and Statistical 
solutions 
(Buttyán, Dóra, and Vajda, 2005)   X 
(Lazos et al., 2005)   X 
(Maheshwari, Gao, and Das, 2007)   X 
Qian, Song et Li, 2007) X   
Network visualization 
(Wang and Lu, 2007; Weichao and Bharat, 2004) 
X   
Trust-based solutions (Pirzada and Mcdonald, 2006) X   
LiteWorp and MobiWorp (Khalil, Bagchi, and Shroff, 2008; Khalil, Saurabh, 
and Shroff, 2005) 
X   
 
Equation Section (Next) 
 
 CHAPTER 4  
 
 
WIM-DSR 
This chapter presents Witness Integration Multipath DSR (WIM-DSR), which is a protocol 
offering a new mechanism for detecting and preventing open wormhole attacks in ad hoc 
networks using the information provided by a variant of the Split Multipath Routing (SMR) 
protocol (Lee and Gerla, 2001).  
 
WIM-DSR finds suspicious patterns related to the presence of wormholes in the network 
without any hardware requirement or protocol modification. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents an introduction to 
Multipath Source Routing protocols. Section 4.2 introduces the notion of strong and weak 
wormhole models. Section 4.3 presents the assumptions sustaining our proposal. Section 4.4 
explains the cornerstone concept of Edge witnesses. Finally, the WIM-DSR route discovery 
process is presented in section 4.5 and the analysis of this approach is given in section 4.6. 
 
4.1 Multipath Source Routing 
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol (Johnson et al., 1996) is an on-demand source 
routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks allowing a node in the ad hoc network to 
dynamically discover and maintain a valid route to any other node in the network. 
 
When a source node wants to set up a communication with any destination node and no valid 
route is found in its route cache, the sender may attempt to discover one using the route 
discovery protocol. The source node broadcasts a RREQ message in the network, identifying 
the target node. As the RREQ message is forwarded by intermediate nodes, they insert their 
respective addresses in the packet header. When the destination receives the RREQ, it replies 
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to the source with a unicast RREP message, reversing the route found in the route record 
from the RREQ header. 
 
The original DSR protocol allows the discovery of a unique path linking two nodes in a 
network. Since mobility is a primary characteristic of ad hoc networks, paths are constantly 
being broken. Nodes are forced to restart the route discovery process, bringing down the 
performance of the network by the bandwidth-consuming broadcast associated with route 
discovery.  
 
Using multiple paths can improve the quality of service, as well as the fault resilience of a 
network. Several adaptations of the DSR protocol seeking to discover disjoint multipaths 
between a source and a destination have been proposed (Lee and Gerla, 2001; Lijun, Ning, 
and Xiangfang, 2007; Xuefei and Cuthbert, 2004; Zafar et al., 2007).  
 
The Split Multipath Routing protocol (SMR) proposed by Lee and Gerla seeks to build 
maximally disjoint paths between any pair of nodes in an ad hoc network (Lee and Gerla, 
2001). When a node wants to set up a communication with another node and no valid route is 
found in its route cache, the source node floods the network with a RREQ message. 
 
As the message is broadcast in the network, several copies traversing different routes arrive 
at the destination. The destination node selects several edge-disjoint paths and sends back 
RREP messages to the source along each of the selected paths. 
 
Unlike DSR, where duplicate RREQs arriving at intermediate nodes are dropped, SMR 
allows intermediate nodes to rebroadcast a duplicate RREQ message if the packet traverses a 
different incoming link from the link from which the first RREQ was received, and if the hop 
count of the incoming packet is no larger than the hop count of the first RREQ received. In 
this way, SMR can select edge-disjoint paths from the routes available. 
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Lijun, Ning, and Xiangfang propose a modification to SMR (Lijun, Ning, and Xiangfang, 
2007). The modified protocol allows intermediate nodes to forward a repeated copy of an 
RREQ message, as long as its hop count is no larger than the hop counts of copies already 
received, even if the packets share the same incoming link. With this modification, the 
destination node will receive a larger number of RREQ messages and will have more 
available paths linking it to the source node, even when those resulting paths are not edge or 
node disjoints. This modified protocol will be used in our approach. 
 
4.2 Strong and Weak Open Wormholes  
Two new types of open wormholes are considered in our approach: weak and strong. In the 
former, the tunnel connects two malicious nodes, 1M  and 2M , located at d and (d + 1) hops 
from the source respectively (see Figure 4.1  (a)). In the latter, the two nodes are located at d 
and at least (d + 2) hops from the source respectively (see Figure 4.1 (b)). 
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Figure 4.1  Open wormholes: (a) weak; and (b) strong. 
 
The specific objective of the attacker in Figure 4.1 (a) would be to substantially increase the 
possibility of having access to the data exchanged by nodes S and D. 
 
In the absence of the wormhole link 1 2M M−  and if the modification of SMR proposed by 
(Lijun, Ning, and Xiangfang, 2007) is used, the attacker is present with any of its two 
controlled nodes ( 1M  and 2M ) in 4 of 7 paths (57.1%) (see Table 4-1). If the wormhole link 
1 2M M−  is activated, then the path 1 2S M M D− − −  is added to Table 4-1 and the attacker 
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will have five over eight opportunities of having at least one node in the chosen path 
(62.5%), raising his chances by only 5.4%. But, most importantly, the wormhole path does 
not have a shorter hop count than the other paths, and therefore having a weak wormhole in a 
network does not give a substantial advantage to an attacker.  
 
Table 4-1  Paths found by the routing 
 protocol (weak wormhole attack) 
 
No. Path 
1 1 2S v M D− − −  
2 1 3S v v D− − −  
3 2 2S v M D− − −  
4 2 3S v v D− − −  
5 2 4S v v D− − −  
6 1 3S M v D− − −  
7 1 4S M v D− − −  
 
If weak open wormholes do not necessarily represent shorter paths to the destinations, strong 
open wormholes do. In fact, strong open wormholes represent the real threat and would 
always be chosen by any routing protocol choosing the shortest paths. The paths obtained by 
node D (see Figure 4.1 (b)) in the absence of the strong wormhole link 1 2M M−  are 
presented in Table 4-2. 
 
The attacker is present with at least one of his two malicious nodes in 9 of 17 paths (52.9%). 
If the wormhole link 1 2M M−  is activated, the links 1 2S M M D− − −  and 
1 2 6S M M v D− − − −  are added to Table 4-2, but the paths 1, 3, 6, 8 and 13 would be erased 
from Table 4-2, because, when the RREQs traversing legal links arrive at node 2M , they will 
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have one hop more in their hop counter than the 1 2S M M− −  RREQ already received and, 
according to the routing protocol, the newly arrived RREQs must be dropped by node 2M . 
Table 4-2  Paths found by the routing  
protocol (strong wormhole attack) 
 
No. Path 
1 1 3 2S v v M D− − − −  
2 1 3 6S v v v D− − − −  
3 1 4 2S v v M D− − − −  
4 1 4 6S v v v D− − − −  
5 1 4 7S v v v D− − − −  
6 2 3 2S v v M D− − − −  
7 2 3 6S v v v D− − − −  
8 2 4 2S v v M D− − − −  
9 2 4 6S v v v D− − − −  
10 2 4 7S v v v D− − − −  
11 2 5 6S v v v D− − − −  
12 2 5 7S v v v D− − − −  
13 1 4 2S M v M D− − − −  
14 1 4 6S M v v D− − − −  
15 1 4 7S M v v D− − − −  
16 1 5 6S M v v D− − − −  
17 1 5 7S M v v D− − − −  
 
The attacker’s presence in the remaining paths as a percentage is now 50% (7 out of 14 
paths). Even if the attacker decreases his presence in the paths by 2.9%, the truly important 
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point is that the shortest path in the whole set is the path containing the malicious link 
1 2M M− . In this way, the attacker succeeds in short-circuiting the network and is sure to be 
part of the chosen path. 
 
Strong wormholes give an attacker a real advantage in the network, becoming a real threat to 
security. Because of this, our approach focuses on detecting and avoiding those attacks. 
 
4.3 Assumptions and Treat Model 
The main objective of the WIM-DSR protocol proposed in this document is to gather 
information during the route discovery phase and use this information to find possible 
anomalies generated by open wormhole attacks. Several assumptions are made to define the 
operation of WIM-DSR in a wireless ad hoc network: 
 
Assumption I The number of malicious nodes coordinating a wormhole attack is restricted 
to two colluding nodes. Even when several pairs of nodes can develop a wormhole attack 
simultaneously in the network at a specific time, each of those attacks will be limited to an 
Active-2-2 attack.  
 
Assumption II Each legitimate node can carry out its neighbor discovery process securely 
(using temporal leashes, RSS, RTT, etc.). 
 
Assumption III Each legitimate node has a unique cryptographic identity, which can be used 
to sign control messages. All legitimate nodes can verify these signatures. 
 
Assumption IV The cryptographic identity is implemented in a secure tamperproof token 
(e.g. a smart card). 
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The second assumption has two important benefits: the nodes know the identity of their 
neighbors, and a malicious node cannot use another remote malicious node as an oracle, 
limiting its chance of performing Sybil attacks (Newsome et al., 2004) 
 
The last two assumptions limit the capacity of a compromised node to impersonate another 
compromised node by using multiple wireless interfaces and multiple cryptographic 
identities, locally limiting the chance of Sybil attacks. Even where these assumptions are not 
stated in the preceding approaches, most of those approaches rely on them.  
 
Finally, the first assumption ensures that a wormhole attack cannot be coordinated by more 
than two nodes, because, if that occurs, the malicious nodes can find a way of circumventing 
our approach. This possibility will be evaluated later.  
 
4.4 Edge Witnesses 
The WIM-DSR protocol determines whether or not the information gathered by the modified 
SMR protocol during the route discovery phase reveals anomalies which are typical of 
wormhole attacks.  
 
We introduce some notations here. Let G(r) = (N,E(r)) be the geometric graph defined by the 
set of nodes N, and r the transmission range of the set of nodes N (Penrose 2003). In this 
graph, two nodes are connected if and only if their distance is less than or equal to r. This 
graph represents the topology of the network. Finally, let ( , )GL X d  define the set of nodes in 
G at d hops of the node X (see Figure 4.3 (b)). This can be obtained by a breadth-first search 
from X. 
 
An open wormhole attack between two malicious nodes should simply add an edge between 
two distant nodes in G(r). This new edge usually shortens the distance between some pair of 
nodes. In Figure 4.1, the edge ( 1M , 2M ) is added to the underlying graph representing the 
topology of the network. The resulting graph is denoted ( )wG r . 
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During route discovery, the destination receives multiple copies of a RREQ message, each of 
which represents a distinct path between the source and the destination. Thus, the destination 
can reconstruct a subset of G(r) (or ( )wG r , if there is a wormhole attack). This subset is 
denoted ( )RREQG r . 
 
The WIM-DSR protocol presented in the next section relies on the following concept of edge 
witnesses: 
 
Definition 1 Let ( , )i je v v=  be an edge of a path from S to D in ( )RREQG r . A node wv  is a 
weakly forward witness for e iff  
 
i. ( d∃ ) [ , ( , )
RREQi w G
v v L S d∈ ]; 
 
ii. edge ( wv , jv ) is in ( )RREQG r . 
 
Definition 2 Let 1 ( , )i je v v=  and 2 ( , )j ke v v=  be two consecutive edges of a path from S to D 
in ( )RREQG r . A node wv is a strong witness for the subchain ( ( , , )i j kv v v ) iff 
 
i. ( d∃ ) [ , ( , )
RREQj w G
v v L S d∈ ];  
ii. edges ( iv , wv ) and ( wv , kv ) are in ( )RREQG r . 
 
The second definition gives a strong witness and should be preferred. It simply states that 
there are two distinct paths joining two nodes in the network. Since there are only two 
malicious nodes (Assumption 1), these strongly witnessed nodes cannot form a wormhole. 
 
Intuitively, an edge witness gives more evidence that two nodes are really neighbors and are 
not part of a wormhole. For example, in Figure 4.1 (b), 1M is the only node at 1 hop from S 
claiming to be adjacent to 2M . Hence, no witness can be found for the edge ( 1M , 2M ).  
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The aim of WIM-DSR is to find fully witnessed paths, i.e. paths with only witnessed edges 
between the source and the destination. The algorithm constructs the fully forward witnessed 
path inductively. Assuming that the source S is not compromised, it proceeds forward hop by 
hop, constructing the set of nodes ( , )
RREQG
L S i for 1i ≥ .  
 
Unfortunately, such a forward path does not always exist. In such a case, assuming that the 
destination D is not compromised, it proceeds backward hop by hop. Definitions 1 and 2 
have to be adapted accordingly to define backward witnesses.  
 
A fully witnessed path should not contain any open wormholes. Strongly witnessed paths 
should be preferred. However, weakly witnessed paths should also be considered, since the 
strongly witnessed condition is very restrictive and can generate numerous false positive 
alarms. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Witnessed paths: (a)  weakly backward; (b)  weakly forward; (c)  strongly 
forward; (d)  strongly backward. 
 
Hence, in Figure 4.2 (a), node 2v  is a backward witness for the edge ( 3v , 4v ). Similarly, in 
Figure 4.2 (b), nodes 4v  and 5v  are weakly forward witnesses for the edges ( 1v , 2v ) and 
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( 2v , 3v ) respectively. In Figure 4.2 (c), node 3v  is a strongly forward witness for (S, 1v , 2v ). 
Finally, in Figure 4.2 (d), node 4v  is a strongly backward witness for ( 1v , 2v , D). 
 
4.5 WIM-DSR Route Discovery 
When a source S wants to discover a valid route to a destination D, it broadcasts a RREQ 
message to the network. Each intermediate node rebroadcasts copies of the RREQ message, 
as long as their hop counts are no larger than the hop counts of copies already received. Since 
this is a source routing protocol, the nodes add their identification to the RREQ messages. 
Thus, several copies of the original RREQ message should arrive at D. 
 
With all the RREQ messages received within a given time interval, destination D is able to 
build a partial representation of the network topology. This is the graph ( )RREQG r . The next 
step is to determine whether or not there exists a fully witnessed path 
0 1 1( , ,......, , )i i il ilp S v v v v D−= = =  in this graph s.t. 
 
• ( k∀  s.t. 0≤k < l− 2) [ ∃ strongly forward witness kw  for ( 1 2, ,ik ik ikv v v+ +  )], or 
• ( k∀  s.t. 1< k ≤l− 1) [∃ weakly forward witness kw  for ( 1,ik ikv v +  )]. 
 
The first alternative is presented in Algorithm 4-1 and finds strongly forward witnessed 
paths. The second alternative is presented in Algorithm 4-2 and finds weakly forward 
witnessed paths. Both algorithms can be easily adapted to determine whether fully backward 
witnessed paths exist or not. 
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Algorithm 4-1  Strongly forward witnessed path selection algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 4-2  Weakly forward witnessed path selection algorithm. 
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Once a fully witnessed path has been found, the destination signs its RREP message and 
broadcasts it towards the source.  
 
For a strongly witnessed path, the destination broadcasts a unique RREP message. This 
message is rebroadcast by all the nodes of the path. The other nodes simply overhear it. This 
allows each witness to receive the RREP message from at least two sources. For a path of 
length l, only l-1 RREP messages are sent overall.  
 
For a weakly witnessed path, the destination unicasts a signed RREP message along the path. 
Moreover, for each witness, the destination also unicasts a signed confirmation RREP 
message along a path going through that witness. For a path of length l, l −1 messages are 
sent by the nodes in ( , )
RREQG
L S i , 1 ≤ i < l. Therefore, 2( 1)l −  messages are sent in total.  
 
Strongly witnessed paths should be preferred. The answering process is more efficient. 
Moreover, these paths offer some alternatives. The subchain 1 1( , , )i i iv w v− +  witnessed by iv  
can replace 1 1( , , )i iv v v− +  witnessed by iw . 
 
4.6 Analysis 
The path selection algorithms used by WIM-DSR cannot discover a weak open wormhole 
attack. In Figure 4.1 (a), the malicious nodes 1M and 2M  have established a wormhole 
between them. The algorithms should find two strongly ( 1v and 2v ), two weakly forward 
( 1v and 2v ), and two strongly backward ( 3v and 4v ) witnesses for this wormhole.  
 
Although this represents false negative detection for WIM-DSR, it does not increase the 
security risk significantly. As seen previously, even without this tunnel between 1M and 2M , 
they would have belonged to four of the seven shortest paths discovered by WIM-DSR (see 
Table 4-1). Thus, the weak open wormhole just adds one new shortest path between the 
source and the destination.  
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The real gain for the malicious nodes is the strong open wormhole attack (see Figure 4.1 (b)). 
In such a case, the malicious node would be selected by any protocol having the shortest path 
as the selection measure. Such a wormhole represents a shortcut in the network.  
 
 
Figure 4.3  Witness: (a)  strong; (b) weak forward, *d > 1d + . 
 
The effectiveness of WIM-DSR in detecting open wormhole attacks is proven in the 
following lemmas, which show that the path selection algorithms cannot find false witnesses 
for strong open wormholes.  
 
Lemma 4.1 Let p be a path containing a strong open wormhole. Algorithm 4-1 cannot find 
any false strong witnesses for the wormhole connecting the two malicious nodes without 
being detected.  
 
Proof  Let (x, y, 1M , 2M ) be the subchain of p containing the strong open wormhole 
between the only malicious nodes 1M and 2M  (Assumption I). The simplest case, where y = 
S, is omitted. By definition, there is no strong witness connecting y and 2M . Thus, 1M with 
the help of 2M would have to forge a fake RREQ message including the partial path (· · · , y, 
w, 2M ) to force Algorithm 4-1 to find the fake witness w.  
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First, suppose that y receives the RREP message from 1M  (see Figure 4.3 (a)). Either w is a 
legitimate neighbor of y or it is not. In the former case, y accepts the message and 
rebroadcasts it. Then, w verifies the signature, rejects the message and broadcasts a signed 
warning message. It is important here that 1M cannot impersonate 2M  for w during the 
neighbor discovery process (Assumptions II to IV). In the latter case, y verifies the signature, 
rejects the message, and broadcasts a warning message. 
 
Now suppose that 1M tries to impersonate y and unicasts the RREP message directly to x. 
When x rebroadcasts the message, y detects an anomaly, verifies the signature, and 
broadcasts a warning message. This also applies if 1M tries to connect to any node in the path 
between S and 1M . Thus, any fake witness can be fought back from a legitimate node.         
 
Lemma 4.2 Let p be a path containing a strong open wormhole. Algorithm 4-2 cannot find 
any forward witness for the wormhole connecting the two malicious nodes without being 
detected. 
 
Proof  Let ( 1M , 2M ) be the subchain of p containing the strong open wormhole between the 
only malicious nodes 1M  and 2M  (Assumption I) and let (· · · , 2M  ,w, y, · · ·) be the 
confirmation RREP message for the d-level witness, i.e. ( , )
RREQG
w L S d∈ , and any 
( , 1)
RREQG
y L S d∈ −  (see Figure 4.3 (b)). By definition, there is no weakly forward witness 
connecting y and 2M . Thus, 1M with the help of 2M  would have to forge a fake RREQ 
message including the partial path (· · · , y,w, 2M ) to force Algorithm 4-2 to find the fake 
witness w.  
 
First suppose that w receives the confirmation RREP message from 2M through 1M  (see 
Figure 4.3 (b)). w then verifies the signature, rejects the message, and broadcasts a signed 
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warning message. It is important here that 1M cannot impersonate 2M  for w during the 
neighbor discovery process (Assumptions II to IV).  
 
Now suppose that 1M  tries to impersonate w and unicasts the confirmation RREP message 
directly to y. This can be discarded either by extending Assumption II to this phase or by 
asking y to unicast an acknowledgement to w, if w is the d-level witness. The latter option 
seems more appropriate, since it avoids having stronger assumptions. Thus, any fake witness 
can be fought back from a legitimate node.                    
 
For efficiency, an intermediate node validates the signature of a message only if it claims 
falsely that the node is connected to another node, or if it is a warning message. Thus, if there 
is no attack, the intermediate nodes do not have to do any cryptographic processing. This is a 
major improvement over several previous solutions, such as that proposed by Wang et al. 
(Wang et al., 2006). 
 
Finally, the malicious nodes 1M and 2M  can cause denials of service by altering the 
information provided during the source routing protocol. They can add or remove nodes in 
the messages. This can be prevented by secure source routing protocols, like Ariadne (Hu, 
Perrig, and Johnson, 2005) or SECTOR (Capkun et al., 2003). However, these protocols are 
quite demanding, and do not prevent wormhole attacks. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 5  
 
 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
In a network security system, false negatives and false positives are used to describe possible 
errors developed in an attack detection process. In the first case, the term false negative 
describes the error that occurs when the security system fails to detect an active attacker 
assailing the network. In the second case, the term false positive refers to an error which 
occurs when the security system in a network erroneously concludes that a legitimate node 
forms part of a network attack. 
 
In Figure 5.1, a false negative error is generated if an existing network security system 
concludes that the link connecting nodes 1M and 2M  is legitimate. 
 
S D{A}M1 M2
open wormhole
Physical linkFalse route wormhole{}
False Negative Error  
Figure 5.1  False negative error. 
 
In Figure 5.2, a false positive error is generated if an existing network security system 
accuses legitimate nodes 1M and 2M  of acting maliciously. 
 
72 
S DA M1 M2
Physical link Legitimate nodes
False Positive Error
 
Figure 5.2  False positive error. 
 
As demonstrated formally in Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 (sections 4.5 and 4.6), it is not 
possible to find any witness node for a strong open wormhole link connecting two malicious 
nodes. Therefore, the rate of false negatives for our approach is zero; thus, no false negative 
alarm is possible. An attacker developing a strong open wormhole attack is always detected 
by our protocol. As there are no possible false negatives, no wormhole attack is simulated. 
 
The final important point to verify in terms of the simulations is whether or not the WIM-
DSR protocol is too restrictive, leading to the detection of numerous false positive attacks.  
 
We have developed a program simulating 100 static nodes randomly distributed in a 
1000m×1000m square. Each simulation analyzes the paths connecting all the possible pairs 
of source and destination nodes. Each experiment presented here corresponds to the average 
results of 1000 simulations on independent sets. The objective is to determine how many 
pairs of source and destination nodes do not have fully witnessed paths in a given set of 
points. These pairs would represent the false positive alarms for WIM-DSR, because they 
would be declared as malicious, even in the absence of a real attack.  
 
Network density is important in ad hoc networks. For a given region, there are two ways to 
increase it: (1) increase the number of nodes; or (2) increase the transmission range of the 
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nodes. Since the complexity of our simulation program depends on the number of nodes, that 
number is fixed and different range values are used. 
It is essential to find a lower bound on the transmission range to ensure that G(r) would be 
connected, or at least would have a large connected component containing most of its nodes. 
It has been proven that such a graph with n nodes is connected with a high probability if the 
transmission range is at least = ln (1)n O
nπ
±  (see (Penrose, 1999) and (Diaz, Mitsche, and 
Perez-Gimenez, 2008)). Such a bound was observed empirically during the simulation 
process. The graph G(r) was not connected in only 128, 44, and 17 cases out of 1000, for 
190m, 210m, and 230m respectively.  
 
We are now ready to present the results of our simulations.  
  
Table 5-1  Number of pairs of nodes (average on 1000 simulations) 
 
Paths 190m 210m 230m
Paths with length = 1 473.0 (9.6%) 567.1 (11.5%) 677.8 (13.5%)
Paths with length = 2 
  Strongly witnessed paths 
  No witnessed paths 
456.9 (9.2%)
245.7 (5.0%)
 
616.5 (12.5%) 
256.8 (5.2%) 
787.3 (15.9%)
263.6 (5.3%)
Paths with length > 2 
  Strongly witnessed paths 
  If not, forward witnessed paths 
2794.0 (56.4%)
302.8 (6.1%)
 
3114.0 (62.9%) 
174.2 (3.5%) 
3105.5 (62.7%)
69.5 (1.4%)
No path between the pair of nodes 22.7 (0.4%) 6.7 (0.1%) 2.4 (0.05%)
No witnessed path (false positive) 655.0 (13.2%) 214.7 (4.3%) 54.0 (1.1%)
 
In a randomly deployed network with 100 nodes, there are 4950 possible combinations of 
pairs of source and destination nodes. Those pairs have been classified based of the length of 
the paths connecting them.  
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Classified in the first group are the pairs of nodes connected by a path of length = 1 (1-hop 
neighbors). According to Table 5-1, the 11.5% of the pairs of source and destination nodes 
obtained in the simulation belong to this group (when a transmission range of 210 m is used). 
For those pairs, no wormhole detection process is required.  
 
In Figure 5.3, if nodes S and 1v  set up a communication, assuming that the source and 
destination nodes are trustable (if the attacker has not compromised either node), then the 
attacker has access to the data exchanged and no wormhole attack is required. If the source 
and destination nodes are directly connected, then the wormhole attack is discarded.  
 
S
v4
D
v1
v2
v3
v7
v5
v6
v8
v9
v10 v11
 
Figure 5.3  Pairs of source-destination nodes. 
 
The second group is formed by the pairs of source and destination nodes connected by a path 
of length = 2 (2-hop neighbors). This group represents 17.7% of the network (when a 
transmission range of 210 m is used). The 70% of pairs in this group are connected by a fully 
witnessed path and 30% share a path that is not fully witnessed. 
 
In Figure 5.3, the pair formed by the nodes S and 5v  is an example of this group. In this case, 
nodes 1v  and 3v  are strong witnesses of the path S- 2v - 5v . In contrast, the path between nodes 
S and 10v  is not fully witnessed, since no witness node can be found for the link 1v - 10v . 
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Even though the rate of false positives seems to be high in this group, the general 
performance of the network is not affected, since no wormhole attack can be developed in 
this set of pairs. If nodes S and 10v  set up a communication using path S- 1v - 10v , assuming 
that the source and destination nodes are trustable, as nodes S and 10v  can ensure that node 1v  
is a mutually valid 1-hop neighbor (Assumption II, chapter 4.3), then no wormhole attack can 
be developed.  
 
The third group is formed by the pairs of source and destination nodes connected by a path 
with length l, where 3 l≤ . This group represents 75.7% of the network (56.4% sharing 
strongly witnessed paths, 6.1% sharing forward witnessed paths and 13.2% with no fully 
witnessed paths representing the false positives) when a transmission range of 210 m is used. 
 
In Figure 5.3, the pair of source and destination nodes formed by nodes S and D is an 
example of this group. In this case, nodes 1v , 4v , and 7v  are strong witnesses in the path S- 2v -
5v - 8v -D. 
 
In the fourth group are the pairs of source and destination nodes where no connecting path 
was found. This group represents 0.1% of the network when a transmission range of 210 m is 
used. In Figure 5.3, the pair of source and destination nodes formed by nodes S and 11v  is an 
example of this group. 
 
In conclusion, for an appropriate network density (210 m or 230 m), only a few pairs of 
nodes (false positive alarms) cannot find fully witnessed paths (4.3% and 1.1% respectively), 
showing that the rate of false positives for this approach is low. In cases where a fully 
witnessed path cannot be found between two nodes, pairs of nodes should pay closer 
attention to their communications.  
 CONCLUSION 
 
The special characteristics of ad hoc networks make them a preferred target from some of the 
most elaborate attacks developed against wireless networks. A specific example of one of 
those attacks is the wormhole attack. This type of attack can pose a severe threat to the 
proper functioning of the network, and its detection and prevention are proving to be a 
difficult task. 
 
In this dissertation, we have focused on analyzing the wormhole attack, reviewing the 
previous approaches and proposing a new efficient solution aimed at counteracting it. The 
WIM-DSR protocol is able to detect all strong open wormhole attacks with a very low rate of 
false positive alarms. This solution does not require any cryptographic processing by the 
intermediate nodes in the absence of an attack, nor does it involve any packet overhead. This 
represents an improvement over the solution presented by Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, unlike most of the previous approaches (Hu and Evans, 2004; Hu, Perrig and 
Johnson, 2003; Jakob, Srikanth and Michalis, 2006; Khalil, Bagchi and Shroff, 2008; Khalil, 
Saurabh and Shroff, 2005; Lijun, Ning and Xiangfang, 2007; Xu and Boppana, 2007), WIM-
DSR offers a verifiable solution to the Sybil-Wormhole attack. The main contributions of this 
dissertation are listed below. 
 
• A general introduction to the principal types of attacks that can be launched on ad hoc 
networks, in particular a detailed review and classification of wormhole attacks, 
including the definition of the Sybil-Wormhole attack. 
 
•  A complete survey of the most important approaches proposed to detect and prevent 
open, half-open, and/or closed wormhole attacks in ad hoc networks. 
 
• An analysis of the Sybil-Wormhole attack and the accuracy of the existing solutions for 
preventing it. 
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•  A new mechanism preventing strong open wormhole attacks, including the Sybil-
Wormhole attack. The WIM-DSR protocol uses the information collected by the 
destination node during the route discovery process of a multipath routing protocol to 
detect suspicious behavior. 
 
• Simulation results which probe the functioning of WIM-DSR in static ad hoc networks 
and its performance in false positive detection. 
 
In this dissertation, a new mechanism for detecting open wormhole attacks in ad hoc 
networks has been proposed. This mechanism can be improved in several ways. A list of 
possible future works related to this subject is presented and includes the following: 
 
• Development of simulations for studying the behavior of WIM-DSR in an environment 
with mobile nodes. 
 
• Addition of modifications to the protocol with the aim of detecting and preventing 
coordinated wormhole attacks developed by more than two colluding nodes.  
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